Ronald Chavis v. Commonwealth of PA by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-28-2011 
Ronald Chavis v. Commonwealth of PA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Ronald Chavis v. Commonwealth of PA" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 999. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/999 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
BLD-213        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1248 
 ___________ 
 
 RONALD CHAVIS, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-06951) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Timothy J. Savage 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 16, 2011 
 Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN AND GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed June 28, 2011 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Ronald Chavis appeals the District Court’s order that denied his 
request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and dismissed his case.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the District Court’s order for abuse of 
discretion.  See Jones v. Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1985).  For the reasons 
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discussed below, we will summarily vacate the District Court’s order and remand for 
further proceedings.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
Chavis filed a habeas petition that he purported to bring pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241.  Although his allegations are somewhat scattered, a central claim emerges:  he 
contends that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated in a Pennsylvania 
state court criminal action (No. MC-51-CR-0738111-2006) that has been pending for 
four-and-a-half years.  Along with his habeas petition, Chavis submitted a motion to 
proceed IFP, in which he stated that he had no assets. 
The District Court denied Chavis leave to proceed IFP and ordered him to pay the 
$5 filing fee.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).  The Court also ordered Chavis to refile his 
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and supplied him with the official § 2254 form 
used in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  See E.D. Pa. Local Rule 9.3. 
Instead of complying with the Court’s order, Chavis filed a motion in which he 
sought to disqualify the District Judge and reasserted his IFP request.  In this motion, 
Chavis reiterated that he wished to proceed under § 2241.  He also submitted a copy of 
his prison account statement. 
The District Court then entered an order dismissing the action because Chavis had 
“failed to complete and file the required standard form to proceed in forma pauperis as 
required by the [Court’s previous] Order.”  Chavis filed a timely appeal.   
As an initial matter, we interpret the District Court’s dismissal to be based 
primarily on Chavis’s failure to use the official § 2254 form, not his failure to use an IFP 
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form.  In its first order, the District Court denied Chavis’s request to proceed IFP and 
ordered him to pay a filing fee, thus giving little indication that it expected Chavis to 
refile his IFP request.  Meanwhile, the Court explicitly directed Chavis to utilize the 
§ 2254 form.
1
   
However, contrary to the conclusion on which the District Court’s order was 
predicated, Chavis’s filing was not necessarily a § 2254 petition in § 2241 clothing.  In 
certain cases, § 2241 is the appropriate vehicle through which to assert a speedy-trial 
claim.  See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1973); see 
also Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining that a pretrial 
petition asserting speedy-trial rights should be brought under § 2241, not § 2254).  
Therefore, we conclude that the District Court erred in ordering Chavis to refile his 
petition under § 2254, and subsequently dismissing the petition when he insisted it was 
properly filed under § 2241.  While we conclude that Chavis should have been permitted 
to raise his claim in a § 2241 petition, we express no opinion as to whether he is entitled 
to relief.  See generally Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 445-46 (3d Cir. 1975). 
Notwithstanding the above, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s Local Rules 
provide that “[a]ll petitions for writs of habeas corpus . . . shall be filed on forms 
                                                 
1
  Consistent with this interpretation, Rule 2 of the Rules Governing § 2254 
Cases and E.D. Pa. Local Rule 9.3 require prisoners to use the forms prescribed for 
§ 2254 petitions.  On the other hand, the relevant rules concerning IFP applications 
require prisoners to submit an affidavit and information about their prison accounts, but 
make no reference to a standard IFP form.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915; Rule 3 of the Rules 
Governing Section 2254 Cases.  
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provided by the Court.”  Rule 9.3(a).  Therefore, should Chavis wish to proceed under 
§ 2241, he must use the official § 2241 form.  The form contains an IFP application, 
which Chavis should also complete if he desires to proceed without prepaying the filing 
fee.   
Finally, we acknowledge that Chavis has filed a stream of documents in this 
Court.  To the extent that he requests relief beyond what is provided for in this opinion, 
we deny his requests.  We note specifically that we will deny his motion to disqualify the 
District Judge.  Chavis is not entitled to disqualification merely because he disagrees with 
the District Court’s legal rulings.  See, e.g., Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, 
Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). 
We will thus summarily vacate the District Court’s order dismissing the case and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
